A week ago, a technician replaced a router at a Federal Aviation Administration radio site in El Dorado, Ark. It was a routine job, part of the long effort to move the nation’s air traffic control network from copper wire to fiber optics. The new router started flooding that network with data, and the FAA halted departures across the country. By that evening, Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy had asked for $50 billion more from Congress to “finish” the upgrade.
But the equipment that failed on Friday was part of the very modernization Duffy wants to speed up. And when he was asked over the weekend where the router was now, he said it was in “the L3 Harris lab down in Florida.” That’s because the FAA does not own the network that carries radar and radio data to its controllers. L3Harris does, and was responsible for the upgrade. The agency has leased it since 2002 and pays the company to run it. Under the FAA’s own policy, when a vendor owns a system, the vendor is in charge of how changes to that system get made and checked. When something goes wrong, agencies rely on the vendor to explain it. The FAA has outsourced not only the network, but its expertise and accountability as well.
This is a persistent problem across much of government. We have each spent time in the bureaucracy, and we’ve seen this situation before. The same failure sank healthcare.gov in 2013, state unemployment insurance systems in 2020, and the Free Application for Federal Student Aid in 2024. In each case, government treated a critical mission like a back-office chore to be outsourced. It staffed the job with people skilled in requirements, acquisition rules, and contract administration at the expense of people who understood the technology and the work it had to do. Without that expertise, an agency can’t choose a vendor well or tell when one is failing. All it can do is keep paying.
Big systems fail in the private sector too. On Monday, customers of Chase and other large banks spent much of the day unable to log in or move their money. The systems we all rely on have grown more complex and more fragile as we’ve asked more and more of them. The difference is that a company that takes responsibility for its infrastructure can learn from its mistakes and improve. The FAA’s record tells you it is not learning.
In 2009, a misconfigured router on this same network caused an outage much like Friday’s. The Transportation Department’s inspector general said afterward that the F.A.A. had never worked out how to oversee systems it didn’t own, and told it to put experienced technical staff on the job. An internal review recommended building a model of the network so that changes could be tested before they went live. We have looked for evidence that either thing happened and haven’t found any. In September 2025, a failed data service in Dallas turned into a five-hour ground stop because the backup didn’t work. This September, a line failed in Philadelphia, and only then did anyone learn that its backup line had been severed by a railroad crew at some point in the past. These aren’t failures of old technology. They’re what happens when you outsource government’s core mission.
Other Trump administration leaders understand this. After the failure of the FAFSA in 2024, the Department of Education put engineers and product managers of its own in charge, and the Trump administration kept that team and added to it. Instead of more money to more vendors, the department’s own technologists started directing the ones they had, setting priorities based on their own situational awareness rather than on a list of deliverables written years earlier. The FAFSA cycle launched early, and 96 percent of the people surveyed said they were satisfied with it. Education Secretary Linda McMahon credited “technical competence and expertise.” She was right.
The Department of Education is not alone. At Treasury, hundreds of technologists are onboarding in order to manage the department’s IT services, jobs long delegated to contractors. At the Office of Personnel Management, Director Scott Kupor has created Tech Force to bring far more technical talent inside government. These roles lower costs, improve outcomes, and strengthen government.
Duffy’s budget request would do the opposite. In September, the FAA’s administrator testified that $10 billion more would be enough. The formal budget request asked for $30 billion. After Friday it was $50 billion. Numbers like that aren’t engineering estimates. $50 billion to an agency without the right internal capacity turns into more contracts, larger and more complicated than the ones the agency already struggles to manage. Each of those needs acquisition plans, contracting officers, program managers and compliance reviews, and the agency will have to staff up to supply them. The vastly outnumbered technical staff will spend their days feeding that machinery instead of improving the agency’s protocols. This has already started. Unhappy with the pace of the network’s replacement, the FAA handed that job to AT&T in August without a competition and set a deadline of the end of 2028. The Government Accountability Office warned that the rush could itself cause outages.
AI makes our dependence on vendors even less logical. Much of what vendors bill the government for can now be automated. Government contracts still pay hundreds of dollars an hour for people to perform tasks as basic as taking notes at meetings, work that is now effectively free. Multi-billion dollar project budgets invite growing these line items, not shrinking them, and while the cost of that kind of work is falling everywhere else, requests like Secretary Duffy’s would lock in inflated prices for years to come.
Democrats, who take control of Congress in January, could make their own version of this mistake. They fear that agencies have been hollowed out, and want to rebuild them. But filling positions as they were previously defined would continue this abdication of responsibility for key government functions and invite more days like last Friday. Instead, they should seek to replicate the changes in departments like Education that have brought such success.
As the FAA modernization continues, hundreds more connections like the one in El Dorado will need to be replaced. But what urgently needs replacing is outdated assumptions about the kinds of skills we need in government and where accountability lies. Instead of approving $50 billion, Congress should ask Duffy how many people on the FAA’s own payroll could have looked at that router’s configuration and paused the work but were instead busy with paperwork.




As a project manager for Raytheon back in the 90’s, I can attest to this. We were responsible for ATC facilities across the Southeast. A requirement would originate at the FAA. They would develop a scope of work and send it to us. We would in turn hire a contractor to perform the work. Each individual location could have a different company perform the work. And I didn’t actually work for Raytheon. My check came from an engineering company in California. Each of these layers, of course, included a management fee and other duplicate line items. What a stupid way of doing things!
In the D.C. area, a federal GS-14 job pays about $144k to $187k. A GS-15 pays about $169k to $197k. A decent senior software engineer in the private sector can easily make over $200k plus equity. So you’re asking a lot of engineers to take a large pay cut.
Now throw in the government bureaucracy and all the laws and regulations you’d have to deal with. I’ve been a software engineer for 15 years and that doesn’t sound too appealing.
Quite simply the government can’t hire good technical talent because its pay and culture are so inferior to what the public sector can offer.
One way to route around this problem is contracting. If you started hiring in house you’d end up with different and potentially far worse problems if you don’t change the pay and culture issues.